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Abstract
A (randomized, anonymous) voting rule maps any multiset of total orders of
(aka. votes over) a fixed set of alternatives to a probability distribution over these
alternatives. A voting rule f is neutral if it treats all alternatives symmetrically. It
satisfies participation if no voter ever benefits from not casting her vote. It is false-
name-proof if no voter ever benefits from casting additional (potentially different)
votes. It is anonymity-proof if it satisfies participation and it is false-name-proof. We
show that the class of anonymity-proof neutral voting rules consists exactly of the
rules of the following form. With some probability kf ∈ [0, 1], the rule chooses an
alternative at random. With probability 1− kf , the rule first draws a pair of alterna-
tives at random. If every vote prefers the same alternative between the two (and there
is at least one vote), then the rule chooses that alternative. Otherwise, the rule flips a
fair coin to decide between the two alternatives.
1 Introduction
In many settings, a decision must be made on the basis of the preferences of multiple
parties (typically referred to as agents in economics). Common examples include auc-
tions and exchanges (where we must decide on an allocation of resources, as well as
payments to be made or received by the agents) and elections (where we must decide on
one or more political representatives), but there are many other applications. A (direct-
revelation) mechanism takes each agent’s reported preferences as input, and produces
a decision as output. An important issue is that self-interested agents will lie about
their preferences if they perceive it to be to their advantage to do so. Mechanism de-
sign (sometimes viewed as a subfield of game theory) studies how to design mechanisms
that produce good outcomes in spite of this. A key concept in mechanism design is that
of strategy-proofness: a mechanism is strategy-proof if no agent can ever benefit from
lying about her preferences. Strategy-proofness is roughly synonymous with truthfulness
and incentive compatibility.1 In mechanism design, attention is usually restricted to in-
centive compatible direct-revelation mechanisms. This is justified by a result known as
the revelation principle [29, 31, 43, 44], which states (roughly) that, given that agents
will misreport their preferences if they perceive this to be to their benefit, anything that
1To be more precise, strategy-proofness as the term is used here corresponds to dominant-strategies incentive
compatibility. There are weaker notions of incentive compatibility, such as Bayes-Nash incentive compatibility,
where in expectation over the other agents’ preferences an agent is best off reporting her true preferences.
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can be achieved by some mechanism can also be achieved by an incentive compatible
direct-revelation mechanism.2
In recent years, there has been an explosion of interest in mechanism design in the
theoretical computer science community, as well as in the artificial intelligence commu-
nity. This interest is driven in part by necessity, as computer scientists encounter more
settings in which multiple self-interested agents must interact; and in part by opportunity,
as there are many issues in mechanism design that are fundamentally computational in
nature. Research directions include (this list is nowhere near exhaustive): algorithmic
mechanism design [45], where the goal is to make algorithms in distributed settings in-
centive compatible; (closely related) the design of incentive compatible approximation
algorithms in settings where standard mechanisms are computationally hard to execute
(e.g. [41, 3, 40]); automated mechanism design, where the problem of finding an op-
timal mechanism is cast as an optimization problem (e.g. [20]); the design of online
mechanisms where agents arrive and depart over time (e.g. [34, 33, 12, 4]); and applying
techniques from machine learning theory to mechanism design [5]. It is also increasingly
common for computer scientists to develop new characterizations of feasible mechanisms
(e.g. [39, 10, 42]); while such work is not in and of itself computational in nature, it can
be of great help in identifying computationally tractable mechanisms.
In mechanism design, the spaces of possible outcomes and preferences often display
a great deal of structure, which facilitates the designer’s job. For example, in auction set-
tings, it is generally assumed that agents can make and receive payments, and moreover
that their utility is linear in this payment. This enables, for example, Vickrey-Clarke-
Groves mechanisms [54, 14, 32], which always choose the efficient allocation. However,
such structure is not always available: for example, in an election, payments can typically
not be made. If we do not assume any structure on the agents’ preferences, then agents
can rank the possible outcomes (aka. alternatives) in any possible way. These general
settings, in which each agent ranks all the alternatives, and the mechanism chooses an
alternative based on these rankings, are commonly referred to as voting settings. The
rankings are the votes, and the mechanism is usually called a voting rule. Voting is
also a topic of growing interest to computer scientists. Strategic considerations aside,
some voting rules are computationally hard to execute [8, 36, 15, 26, 52, 50, 13], leading
to the use of approximation algorithms and heuristics [26, 2, 1, 24] as well as search-
based approaches [25, 18, 16]. There has also been work characterizing the communica-
tion complexity of various voting rules [21]. Additionally, researchers have investigated
how computationally hard it is to find a way of misreporting one’s preferences that is
beneficial [7, 6, 19, 27, 22, 48, 49, 35, 23, 50], as well as whether there are compu-
tational barriers to other undesirable behavior, for example by the chairperson of the
election [9, 37, 28, 50]. Finally, there has been work on concisely representing pref-
erences in voting [38, 55], as well as on extending voting theory to allow for partial
preferences [46, 51, 47].
The revelation principle applies to voting settings just as it does to any other mech-
anism design setting, so we should ask which rules are strategy-proof. Gibbard [30]
provides a complete characterization of strategy-proof voting rules that are allowed to
use randomization. (This characterization generalizes the better-known, earlier Gibbard-
Satterthwaite theorem [29, 53].) He shows that any strategy-proof rule is a randomiza-
tion over unilateral rules, in which only one vote affects the outcome, and duple rules, in
2To predict what will happen under a mechanism that is not incentive compatible, some solution concept
from game theory must be used, and the version of incentive compatibility in the revelation principle depends
on the choice of solution concept.
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which only two alternatives have a chance of winning. (Because the overall rule is a ran-
domization over such rules, it can still be the case that every voter affects the probability
with which an alternative is chosen, and that every alternative has a positive probability of
winning.) He also provides some additional conditions on these rules to obtain an exact
characterization of the strategy-proof voting rules.
However, especially from the perspective of a computer scientist, strategy-proofness
is often not sufficient. In open, anonymous environments such as the Internet, an agent
can manipulate the mechanism in other ways. For one, if an agent does not partici-
pate in the mechanism, then the party running the mechanism (aka. the center) is not
even aware of her existence. Perhaps more significantly, an agent can open multiple ac-
counts and participate in the mechanism multiple times under different identifiers—and
the center cannot know which identifiers correspond to the same agent. This led to the
concept of false-name-proofness [58, 59]. A mechanism is false-name-proof if an agent
can never benefit from using multiple identifiers. Various positive and negative results on
false-name-proofness have been obtained for combinatorial auctions and similar settings
(e.g. [58, 56, 59, 57]), but to our knowledge this concept has not yet been studied in the
literature on voting.
In this paper, we define a (possibly randomized) voting rule to be anonymity-proof if
it is false-name-proof, and it never hurts an agent to cast her (true) vote. Under the same
model as Gibbard [30], we obtain a complete characterization of the anonymity-proof
neutral voting rules. (A voting rule is neutral if it treats all alternatives symmetrically.)
The proof is from first principles and (arguably) of reasonable length. The resulting class
of voting rules is very limited (hence the result is mostly negative), but it does allow
a modicum of responsiveness to the votes in cases where there is complete agreement
among the voters on some pairs of alternatives. For example, in the special case where
there are only two alternatives, the characterization tells us that if all votes prefer the same
alternative, we can choose that alternative; but otherwise, we have to flip a fair coin to
decide between them. This is in stark contrast to the case where we require only strategy-
proofness: simply choosing the alternative that is preferred by more voters (the majority
rule) is strategy-proof.
2 Definitions
Let X , |X| = m, be the set of alternatives over which the voters are voting. A voter’s
preferences are given by a total order Â over the alternatives, together with a vector of
utilities ~u = (u1, . . . , um) where ui is the voter’s utility for the alternative that she ranks
ith. (It is required that ui > ui+1 for all 1 ≤ i ≤ m.) Each voter seeks to maximize
her expected utility. As in Gibbard [30], voters only report a total order (ranking) of
the alternatives (not their utilities); a reported ranking is called a vote. Again as in Gib-
bard [30], we do not allow for indifferences (real or reported) between alternatives. We
will use the notation v = a1 Â . . . Â am for a vote. We will sometimes also use subsets
in the order notation: for example, if B = {b1, b2, b3}, then a1 Â b1 Â b2 Â b3 Â a2
and a1 Â b3 Â b1 Â b2 Â a2 are both of the form a1 Â B Â a2 (but, for instance,
a1 Â b3 Â b2 Â a2 Â b1 is not of this form). A voting rule f takes a multiset3
of votes V as input, and chooses the winning alternative based on these votes (possi-
3This is implicitly assuming that every vote is treated equally; anything else would seem unreasonable in
open, anonymous environments. Rules that treat every vote equally are commonly called anonymous; this is
not to be confused with the definition of anonymity-proofness.
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bly using randomization). Let Pf (V, a) denote the probability with which f chooses a
given votes V ; the function Pf defines the rule f . A voting rule is neutral if it treats
all alternatives symmetrically—that is, if pi is a permutation of the alternatives, then
Pf (pi(V ), pi(a)) = Pf (V, a) (where pi(V ) is the multiset that results from replacing each
alternative a by pi(a) in each vote in V ). In fact, the following weaker definition of neu-
trality will also suffice for our purposes: if a subset B of the alternatives is symmetric in
V (that is, for any permutation pi for which pi(a) = a for all a ∈ X − B, pi(V ) = V ),
then Pf (V, b1) = Pf (V, b2) for all b1, b2 ∈ B. We are only interested in neutral voting
rules.4
Definition 1 A voting rule f is false-name-proof if for any multiset of votes V , for any
v ∈ V, v = a1 Â . . . Â am, for any decreasing ~u = (u1, . . . , um), and for any multiset
of votes V ′,
∑m
j=1 Pf (V, aj)uj ≥
∑m
j=1 Pf (V ∪ V ′, aj)uj . That is, the voter corre-
sponding to v cannot increase her expected utility by additionally casting votes V ′.
It should be noted that under this definition, a voter who uses false names is assumed
to cast at least one vote representing her true preferences. This only weakens the require-
ment. All of the rules in the characterization result of this paper are also false-name-proof
in the stronger sense where none of the votes cast by the false-name voter are required
to represent her true preferences. Hence, the characterization remains the same if this
stronger requirement is used.
Definition 2 A voting rule f satisfies participation if for any multiset of votes V , for any
v ∈ V, v = a1 Â . . . Â am, for any decreasing ~u = (u1, . . . , um),
∑m
j=1 Pf (V, aj)uj ≥∑m
j=1 Pf (V − {v′}, aj)uj . That is, the voter corresponding to v cannot increase her
expected utility by not casting her vote.
Definition 3 A voting rule is anonymity-proof if it is false-name-proof and it satisfies
participation.
Anonymity-proofness does not directly mention strategy-proofness. Thus, it may ap-
pear that even if a rule is anonymity-proof, it is possible that a voter can benefit from mis-
reporting her preferences. However, all of the rules in the characterization result of this
paper are also strategy-proof (this is implied by the fact that they satisfy the stronger ver-
sion of false-name-proofness). Hence, the characterization remains the same if strategy-
proofness is added as a requirement.
3 The characterization of anonymity-proof rules
In this section, we prove the main result. The proof mostly consists of six lemmas; the
main theorem follows quite easily from the last three lemmas.
The first lemma is a fundamental building block of the proof. It states that if we add
a vote that agrees with an existing vote on the top k and bottom l − k alternatives, then
the probability of winning for each of those alternatives does not change.
Lemma 1 Consider a multiset of votes V , and suppose that for some v ∈ V , v is of the
form a1 Â . . . Â ak Â B Â ak+1 Â . . . Â al. Let v′ (not necessarily in V ) be another
4Sometimes rules that are not neutral are of interest, for example if one alternative is the incumbent and
should be treated specially; but in most settings, only neutral rules are of interest.
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vote of the form a1 Â . . . Â ak Â B Â ak+1 Â . . . Â al (that is, it is identical to v
except for the internal ordering of B). Then, if f is anonymity-proof, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ l,
Pf (V, ai) = Pf (V ∪ {v′}, ai).
Proof: First, let us suppose that for some 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Pf (V, ai) 6= Pf (V ∪ {v′}, ai).
Without loss of generality, suppose that for any 1 ≤ j < i, Pf (V, aj) = Pf (V ∪{v′}, aj).
Consider the utility vector ~u = (1− ², 1− 2², . . . , 1− i², (m− i)², (m− i− 1)², . . . , ²).
First, let us suppose that Pf (V, ai) < Pf (V ∪ {v′}, ai). Then, if the true preferences
are given by V , the voter casting v has utility vector ~u, and ² is sufficiently small, then
the voter casting v has an incentive to cast v′ as well. This is because (as ² → 0) she
effectively seeks to maximize the probability of one of a1, . . . , ai winning, and casting
v′ as well does not affect the probabilities of a1, . . . , ai−1 winning and increases that
of ai. On the other hand, suppose that Pf (V, ai) > Pf (V ∪ {v′}, ai). Then, if the
true preferences are given by V ∪ {v′}, the voter casting v′ has utility vector ~u, and ²
is sufficiently small, then the voter casting v′ has an incentive to not participate. This is
because (as ²→ 0) she effectively seeks to maximize the probability of one of a1, . . . , ai
winning, and not participating does not affect the probabilities of a1, . . . , ai−1 winning
and increases that of ai. Hence, for any 1 ≤ i ≤ k, Pf (V, ai) = Pf (V ∪ {v′}, ai).
The case where Pf (V, ai) 6= Pf (V ∪{v′}, ai) for some k+1 ≤ i ≤ l can be shown to
contradict either false-name-proofness or participation by a symmetric argument (where,
supposing without loss of generality that Pf (V, aj) = Pf (V ∪{v′}, aj) for all i < j ≤ l,
the voter casting v or v′ effectively tries to minimize the probability of one of the last
l − i+ 1 alternatives winning).
We obtain the following corollary, which states that it does not matter if the same vote
is cast more than once. (This corollary is usually not powerful enough to use instead of
the more general Lemma 1, but it provides some insight.)
Corollary 1 For an anonymity-proof rule f , given that a vote is cast at least once, it does
not matter how often it is cast.
Proof: This follows from setting B = ∅ in Lemma 1.
Lemma 1 allows us to prove the following lemma, which states that reordering the
alternatives after a given alternative b in a vote, as well as reordering those before b, does
not affect b’s probability of winning, unless we move alternatives past b.
Lemma 2 Consider a multiset of votes V , and suppose that for some v ∈ V , v is of the
form A Â b Â C. Let v′ (not necessarily in V ) be another vote of the form A Â b Â C
(that is, it is identical to v except for the internal ordering of A and C). Then, if f is
anonymity-proof, Pf (V, b) = Pf ((V − {v}) ∪ {v′}, b). That is, we can permute the
alternatives on either of b in a vote without affecting b’s probability of winning.
Proof: Suppose first that we permute only C, that is, that A is ordered the same way in
both v and v′. Then, we can apply Lemma 1 (letting b correspond to ak in that lemma)
to obtain Pf (V, b) = Pf (V ∪ {v′}, b), and similarly Pf ((V −{v})∪ {v′}, b) = Pf (V ∪
{v′}, b), hence Pf (V, b) = Pf ((V − {v}) ∪ {v′}, b). The case where we permute only
A can be proven symmetrically. But then, in the general case where both A and C are
permuted, we can transform v into v′ in two steps, as follows. Let v′′ be the vote of the
form A Â b Â C that agrees with v on A but with v′ on C. By the above, we have
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Pf (V, b) = Pf ((V − {v}) ∪ {v′′}, b) = Pf ((V − {v}) ∪ {v′}, b).
The next lemma shows that we can move an alternative b past a given alternative a
in a vote, without affecting a’s probability of winning, if the other votes disagree on the
relative ranking of a and b.
Lemma 3 Consider a multiset of votes V , and suppose that for some v ∈ V , a is ranked
before b. Additionally, suppose there is another vote v′ ∈ V that ranks a before b, and
a third vote v′′ ∈ V that ranks b before a. Let v′′′ be a vote (not necessarily in V ) that
is obtained from v by improving b’s position, placing it somewhere ahead of a (while
not changing the order in any other way). Then, if f is anonymity-proof, Pf (V, a) =
Pf ((V −{v})∪ {v′′′}, a). That is, we can move b to the other side of a in a vote without
affecting a’s probability of winning, if there are other votes that rank a before b and b
before a.
Proof: Let us first assume that a and b are adjacent in v and v′′′. That is, a is ranked
directly before b in v, and v′′′ is obtained from v simply by swapping a and b. By
Lemma 1 (letting {a, b} correspond to B in that lemma), for any alternative c /∈ {a, b},
Pf (V, c) = Pf (V ∪ {v′′′}, c), and also Pf ((V − {v}) ∪ {v′′′}, c) = Pf (V ∪ {v′′′}, c).
Now, if we suppose that Pf (V, a) < Pf (V ∪ {v′′′}, a), then, if the true preferences are
given by V , the voter corresponding to v′ would be better off casting v′′′ as well (since it
will only affect the probabilities of a and b being elected, and v′ prefers a). Conversely,
if Pf (V, a) > Pf (V ∪ {v′′′}, a), then the voter corresponding to v′′ would be better off
casting v′′′ as well. Hence, since f is false-name-proof, Pf (V, a) = Pf (V ∪ {v′′′}, a).
It similarly follows that Pf ((V − {v}) ∪ {v′′′}, a) = Pf (V ∪ {v′′′}, a) (since v′ and v′′
are still present in (V − {v}) ∪ {v′′′}). Hence, Pf (V, a) = Pf ((V − {v}) ∪ {v′′′}, a).
Now let us return to the general case where a and b are not necessarily adjacent in v
and v′′′. Let v′′′′ be the result of improving b’s position in v to just after a, and let v′′′′′
be the result of swapping a and b in v′′′′. Using Lemma 2, Pf (V, a) = Pf ((V − {v}) ∪
{v′′′′}, a); using the above argument, Pf ((V − {v}) ∪ {v′′′′}, a) = Pf ((V − {v}) ∪
{v′′′′′}, a); and using Lemma 2 again, Pf ((V − {v}) ∪ {v′′′′′}, a) = Pf ((V − {v}) ∪
{v′′′}, a).
In the next lemma, we use the previous lemmas to reduce a set of votes to a particular
pair of votes, without affecting a’s probability of winning.
Lemma 4 Given a nonempty multiset of votes V and a distinguished alternative a, let B
be the set of alternatives that are ranked before a by every vote in V , let C be the set of
alternatives that are ranked before a by some votes in V and after a by others, and letD
be the set of alternatives that are ranked after a by every vote in V . Let v (not necessarily
in V ) be a vote of the form B Â a Â C ∪D, and let v′ (not necessarily in V ) be a vote
of the form B ∪ C Â a Â D. Then, if f is anonymity-proof, Pf (V, a) = Pf ({v, v′}, a).
Proof: By Corollary 1 we can add copies of votes without affecting any winning proba-
bilities, hence we can assume without loss of generality that there are at least 3 votes in
V . First, we use Lemmas 2 and 3 to change an arbitrary one of V ’s votes (let us call this
vote v′′) into v′, without changing the probability of a winning, as follows. By Lemma 2,
we only need to get this vote in the form B ∪ C Â a Â D. v′′ must already be of the
form B ∪ C1 Â {a} Â D ∪ C2 (for some partition C = C1 ∪ C2), hence we only need
to move each element c ∈ C2 ahead of a. We can use Lemma 3 to do so, unless v′ is the
only vote in which a is ranked ahead of c. If this is the case, because there are at least 3
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votes, we can use Lemma 3 to first move c after a in one of the other votes, after which
we can move c ahead of a in the vote (that was originally) v′′.
Now that v′ is one of our votes, we change every other vote into v using Lemmas 2
and 3, as follows. Again, by Lemma 2, we only need to get such a vote into the form
B Â a Â C ∪D, and the vote must already be of the form B ∪ C1 Â {a} Â D ∪ C2.
We can use Lemma 3 to move every c ∈ C1 after a, because v′ ranks c ahead of a, and at
least one other vote ranks a ahead of c.
At this point, we have one vote v′ and multiple votes v. But by Corollary 1 we can
remove the duplicates of v, obtaining {v, v′} without having changed a’s probability of
winning.
It should be noted that Lemma 4 does not cover the case where V = ∅; in this case,
neutrality demands that an alternative be chosen uniformly at random. The next lemma
characterizes the behavior of an anonymity-proof voting rule when only a single vote is
cast.
Lemma 5 Let v = a1 Â . . . Â am. Let f be anonymity-proof and neutral, and let
pif = Pf ({v}, ai). Then, for some constant 0 ≤ kf ≤ 1, pif = kf/m+(1−kf )(m− i) ·
2/(m(m − 1)). That is, with probability kf the rule chooses an alternative at random,
and with probability 1 − kf it draws a pair of alternatives at random and chooses the
preferred one.
Proof: For an arbitrary 1 ≤ i ≤ m − 2, consider the votes v′ = a1 Â . . . Â ai−1 Â
ai+1 Â ai Â ai+2 Â ai+3 Â . . . Â am and v′′ = a1 Â . . . Â ai−1 Â ai Â
ai+2 Â ai+1 Â ai+3 Â . . . Â am. Note that v, v′, and v′′ are all of the form a1 Â
. . . Â ai−1 Â {ai, ai+1, ai+2} Â ai+3 Â . . . Â am. Thus, by Lemma 1, letting
V = {v, v′, v′′}, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1 or any i + 3 ≤ j ≤ m, Pf (V, aj) = pjf . It
follows that Pf (V, ai) + Pf (V, ai+1) + Pf (V, ai+2) = pif + p
i+1
f + p
i+2
f . Moreover,
since v′′ can be obtained from v by swapping ai+1 and ai+2, by Lemma 1, Pf (V, ai) =
P ({v, v′}, ai). Again by Lemma 1, for any 1 ≤ j ≤ i − 1 or any i + 2 ≤ j ≤ m,
Pf ({v, v′}, aj) = pjf . It follows that Pf ({v, v′}, ai) + Pf ({v, v′}, ai+1) = pif + pi+1f ;
moreover, by neutrality, Pf ({v, v′}, ai) = Pf ({v, v′}, ai+1) = (pif + pi+1f )/2. Hence
Pf (V, ai) = (pif + p
i+1
f )/2. It can symmetrically be shown (using the vote set {v, v′′})
that Pf (V, ai+2) = (pi+1f + p
i+2
f )/2. It follows that Pf (V, ai+1) = p
i
f + p
i+1
f + p
i+2
f −
(pif + p
i+1
f )/2 − (pi+1f + pi+2f )/2 = (pif + pi+2f )/2. However, we can obtain another
expression for Pf (V, ai+1) as follows. By Lemma 1, we can add votes a1 Â . . . Â
ai−1 Â ai+1 Â ai+2 Â ai Â ai+3 Â . . . Â am and a1 Â . . . Â ai−1 Â ai+2 Â
ai Â ai+1 Â ai+3 Â . . . Â am without affecting the probability of ai+1 winning. We
can also add the vote a1 Â . . . Â ai−1 Â ai+2 Â ai+1 Â ai Â ai+3 Â . . . Â am,
by adding a copy of v′ using Corollary 1 and then moving ai+2 up two places (which
does not affect the probability of ai+1 winning, by Lemma 3). But in the resulting vote
set, ai, ai+1, and ai+2 are symmetric, and because by Lemma 1 all the other alternatives
still have the same probability, it follows that Pf (V, ai+1) = (pif + p
i+1
f + p
i+2
f )/3.
Subtracting the latter expression for Pf (V, ai+1) from the former we obtain 0 = (pif +
pi+2f )/6 − pi+1f /3, or equivalently pi+2f − pi+1f = pi+1f − pif . It follows that pif is a
linear function of i.
∑m
i=1 p
i
f = 1, so the average value of p
i
f must be 1/m. Moreover,
the pif must be nonincreasing in i (otherwise, if v is the only vote, that voter would
prefer to not participate and obtain the uniform distribution over alternatives). The most
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sharply decreasing function would set pif = (m − i) · 2/(m(m − 1)) so that pmf = 0
and p1f = 2/m. Hence, any correct function for p
i
f must be a weighted average of this
function and the constant function that gives probability 1/m to each alternative.
The final lemma characterizes the probability of a winning in the special pair of votes
from Lemma 4, using Lemma 5.
Lemma 6 Let v be a vote of the form B Â a Â C ∪ D, and let v′ be a vote of the
form B ∪ C Â a Â D. Then, if f is anonymity-proof and neutral, Pf ({v, v′}, a) =
kf/m + (1 − kf )(2|D| + |C|)/(m(m − 1)), where kf is defined as in Lemma 5. That
is, the probability that a wins is the same as under the following rule for selecting the
winner: with probability kf the rule chooses an alternative at random; with probability
1 − kf it draws a pair of alternatives at random, and if every vote prefers the same
alternative between the two, it chooses that alternative, otherwise it flips a fair coin to
decide between the two alternatives.
Proof: Using Lemma 2, we can assume without loss of generality that v is of the form
B Â a Â C Â D, that v′ is of the form B Â C Â a Â D, and moreover that the
internal orderings of B and D are the same in both votes. By Lemmas 1 and 5, this
implies that the alternative ranked ith in B wins with probability pif , and the alternative
ranked ith in D wins with probability p|B|+|C|+1+if . Now, suppose that Pf ({v, v′}, a) <
kf/m + (1 − kf )(2|D| + |C|)/(m(m − 1)). Let us consider the utility vector ~u =
(1 − ², 1 − 2², . . . , 1 − (|B| + 1)², (|C| + |D|)², (|C| + |D| − 1)², . . . , ²). Then, if the
true preferences are given by {v, v′}, the voter casting v has utility vector ~u, and ² is
sufficiently small, then the voter casting v has an incentive to cast a number of additional
votes of the form B Â {a} ∪C Â D (with B andD in the same order as in v), in such a
way that all alternatives in {a}∪C are symmetric in the resulting vote set. This is because
(as ²→ 0) she effectively seeks to maximize the probability of one ofB∪{a}winning; by
Lemma 1, her additional votes will not affect the winning probabilities of the alternatives
in B and D; and by neutrality, the resulting probability of a winning will be (1/(|C| +
1))
∑|B|+|C|+1
i=|B|+1 p
i
f = (1/(|C|+1))
∑|B|+|C|+1
i=|B|+1 kf/m+(1−kf )(m−i)·2/(m(m−1)) =
kf/m + (1 − kf )(m − |B| − 1 +m − |B| − |C| − 1)/2 · 2/(m(m − 1)) = kf/m +
(1− kf )(2m− 2|B| − |C| − 2)/(m(m− 1)) = kf/m+(1− kf )(2|D|+ |C|)/(m(m−
1)). Hence, false-name-proofness implies Pf ({v, v′}, a) ≥ kf/m + (1 − kf )(2|D| +
|C|)/(m(m − 1)). By a symmetric argument, in which the voter corresponding to v′
effectively tries to minimize the probability of one of {a} ∪D winning, it can be shown
that Pf ({v, v′}, a) ≤ kf/m+ (1− kf )(2|D|+ |C|)/(m(m− 1)).
Using the last three lemmas, the main result is now easy to prove:
Theorem 1 The class of voting rules f that are anonymity-proof and neutral consists ex-
actly of the following rules. With some probability kf ∈ [0, 1], we choose an alternative
at random. With probability 1 − kf it draws a pair of alternatives at random. If every
vote prefers the same alternative between the two (and there is at least one vote), then
it chooses that alternative. Otherwise, it flips a fair coin to decide between the two al-
ternatives. (All these rules are also false-name-proof in a stronger sense where the voter
need not cast any vote with her true preferences, and this also implies that they are all
strategy-proof.)
Proof: Let us first show that these rules indeed have the desired properties. They are
clearly neutral. Conditional on a single random alternative being chosen, voters have
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no incentive to use false names or to not participate. Conditional on a random pair a, b
of alternatives being drawn, there are four possibilities for a voter (who, without loss of
generality, prefers a):
1. There are no other votes. In this case, the voter has a strict incentive to participate
so that a is chosen, and no incentive to use false names.
2. All other votes prefer a. In this case, the voter has no incentive to use false names
or not participate, since a will be chosen in any case.
3. All other votes prefer b. In this case, the voter has a strict incentive to participate
so that at least a coin is flipped, and no incentive to use false names.
4. There are other votes that prefer a and other votes that prefer b. In this case, the
voter has no incentive to use false names or not participate, since a coin will be
flipped in any case.
We now show that there are no other rules with the desired properties. Let f be
anonymity-proof and neutral. Lemma 5 defines kf for this rule. Now, for an arbitrary
multiset of votes V and an arbitrary alternative a, Lemma 4 shows how to convert V to a
particular set of two votes {v, v′}, in a way that preserves a’s probability of winning, and
also preserves a’s relationship to any other alternative b in the following sense:
• If all votes prefer a to b in V , the same is true in {v, v′}.
• If all votes prefer b to a in V , the same is true in {v, v′}.
• If some but not all votes prefer a to b in V , the same is true in {v, v′}.
Finally, Lemma 6 shows that for this set of two votes {v, v′}, alternative’s a’s probability
of winning is as in the claim of this theorem. Because of the preservation properties of
the conversion, this must also be true for the original set of votes V .
4 Discussion
In this section, we study some corollaries of the main result, and make some comparisons
to rules that are only strategy-proof.
The characterization makes it clear that the optimal anonymity-proof rule (in any
reasonable sense of the word “optimal”) is the one corresponding to kf = 0, since this
rule maximizes the probability that we can at least choose the better of two alternatives
(if all votes agree). Even this rule is limited in the extent to which it can respond to the
votes:
Corollary 2 Under an anonymity-proof rule, the probability of any given alternative a
winning is at most 2/m (for any multiset of votes). This probability is attained if and only
if kf = 0 and all votes rank a first.
This is in sharp contrast to the class of strategy-proof rules. For example, it is strategy-
proof to draw one of the votes at random and choose its most-preferred alternative (often
referred to as the “random-dictator” rule). Under this rule, if an alternative ranks first in
all votes, it will be chosen with probability 1. Also, within the class of strategy-proof
rules, there is no rule that is clearly optimal. For example, it is also strategy-proof to
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draw a pair of alternatives at random, and choose the one that is preferred by more voters.
Unlike the random-dictator rule, if there is an alternative that ranks first in all votes, this
rule does not necessarily choose it; on the other hand, unlike the random-dictator rule,
this rule does not run the risk of choosing an alternative that is ranked last by almost every
vote (but first by a few).
Another sharp contrast between strategy-proof rules such as the above two and any
anonymity-proof rule is the following. For the winning alternative not to be chosen uni-
formly at random, anonymity-proof rules require complete agreement on at least one pair
of alternatives:
Corollary 3 If V and a are such that for any b 6= a, there is a vote in V that prefers a to
b, as well as one that prefers b to a, then for any anonymity-proof voting rule, Pf (V, a) =
1/m.
Proof: If a pair of alternatives including a is drawn, a coin toss will result. Therefore
Pf (V, a) = kf/m+ (1− kf )(2/m)(1/2) = 1/m.
Our final corollary is computational in nature:
Corollary 4 For any anonymity-proof voting rule f , it is easy to compute Pf (V, a) for
any inputs V and a.
Proof: If m1 is the number of alternatives that are always ranked after a, and m2 is the
number of alternatives that are sometimes ranked before a, and sometimes ranked after
a, then Pf (V, a) = kf/m+ (1− kf )(2m1 +m2)/(m(m− 1)).
It is not immediately clear if a similar result holds for strategy-proof rules. For one,
it is not immediately clear if there is a natural concise representation for such rules. (In
contrast, per Theorem 1, an anonymity-proof neutral voting rule can be represented by a
single number kf ∈ [0, 1].)
5 Future research
Although Theorem 1 completely characterizes anonymity-proof neutral voting rules, much
remains to be done in future research. The most natural next direction to take is to con-
sider settings where the space of possible preferences is restricted. It is well-known that
such restrictions can introduce very satisfactory strategy-proof rules. For example, in
many settings there is a natural order on the alternatives (e.g. in political elections, we
can order candidates by how far to the left of the political spectrum they are). In such a
setting, a voter’s preferences are said to be single-peaked if she always prefers alternatives
that are closer to her most-preferred alternative to alternatives that are further away (when
these alternatives are on the same side of the most-preferred alternative) [11]. It is well-
known that when preferences are single-peaked, choosing the most preferred alternative
of the median voter (the voter that, if we sort the voters by their most preferred alterna-
tives, ends up in the middle) is strategy-proof, and (if the number of voters is odd) this
alternative will be preferred to any other alternative by more than half of the voters (i.e. it
is the Condorcet winner). Single-peakedness can only be of limited help for anonymity-
proofness: for example, when there are only two alternatives, single-peakedness does not
restrict preferences at all, so we cannot do anything more than in the general case. How-
ever, there may be other restrictions that are more fruitful. Specific application settings
10
can also allow for more positive results, as has already been shown to be the case for
combinatorial auctions. (In a sense, such settings correspond to a very special way of re-
stricting preferences.) Finally, if no good anonymity-proof mechanisms turn out to exist
for a setting that we are interested in, then we need to consider other options. One natural
solution is to verify agents’ identities, that is, to check whether multiple preference re-
ports came from the same agent. It is generally not necessary to verify the identities of all
agents; rather, it suffices to verify those of a select few based on the submitted preference
reports [17]. A final approach is to try to stop the problem at the source and make it
impossible or impractical for an agent to sign up for more than one account, but it seems
difficult to do so without compromising the anonymity of the Internet.
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